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Abstract
Objective: To assess potential transmission of antibiotic-resistant organisms (AROs) using surrogate markers and bacterial cultures.
Design: Pilot study.
Setting: A 1,260-bed tertiary-care academic medical center.
Participants: The study included 25 patients (17 of whom were on contact precautions for AROs) and 77 healthcare personnel (HCP).
Methods: Fluorescent powder (FP) and MS2 bacteriophage were applied in patient rooms. HCP visits to each room were observed for
2–4 hours; hand hygiene (HH) compliance was recorded. Surfaces inside and outside the room and HCP skin and clothing were assessed
for fluorescence, and swabs were collected for MS2 detection by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and selective bacterial cultures.
Results: Transfer of FP was observed for 20 rooms (80%) and 26 HCP (34%). Transfer of MS2 was detected for 10 rooms (40%) and 15 HCP
(19%). Bacterial cultures were positive for 1 room and 8 HCP (10%). Interactions with patients on contact precautions resulted in fewer FP
detections than interactions with patients not on precautions (P< .001); MS2 detections did not differ by patient isolation status. Fluorescent
powder detections did not differ by HCP type, but MS2 was recovered more frequently from physicians than from nurses (P= .03). Overall,
HH compliance was better among HCP caring for patients on contact precautions than among HCP caring for patients not on precautions
(P= .003), among nurses than among other nonphysician HCP at room entry (P= .002), and among nurses than among physicians at room
exit (P= .03). Moreover, HCP who performed HH prior to assessment had fewer fluorescence detections (P= .008).
Conclusions: Contact precautions were associated with greater HCP HH compliance and reduced detection of FP and MS2.
(Received 21 October 2019; accepted 14 December 2019; electronically published 23 January 2020)
Antibiotic-resistant organisms (AROs) present a major infection
control threat for patients in hospitals, and they increase the risk
of serious healthcare-associated infections. Hospital environmen-
tal surfaces can become contaminated with AROs and may con-
tribute to ARO transmission, either directly or via the hands or
clothing of healthcare personnel (HCP).1–5 Contact precautions
(gowns and gloves) have been an essential component of infection
prevention practices to limit transmission of AROs.6 However,
there has been debate regarding whether contact precautions are
effective in reducing ARO transmission.7–9
The relationships among environmental contamination, HCP
cross contamination, and ARO transmission are difficult to study.
Previous studies have demonstrated that contaminated hospital
surfaces can contribute to the spread of nosocomial infections.10–12
Other studies have demonstrated ARO transfer from infected patients
or contaminated surfaces to the hands and clothing of HCP.13–17
However, few studies have focused on the relationship between
contaminated surfaces in patient rooms and the risk of HCP cross
contamination outside patient rooms.18
Additional studies that examine the associations between envi-
ronmental surface contamination, HCP cross contamination and
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ARO transmission patterns, and the impact of contact isolation
practices on these associations, are needed to better inform
policies and procedures for the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and to reduce ARO transmission and healthcare-associated
infections (HAIs). Surrogate markers, such as fluorescent pow-
der (FP) and MS2, a nonpathogenic bacteriophage, are unique
tools for studying ARO transmission and cross contamination
in hospitals.19,20 Fluorescent powder and MS2 have been used to
study HCP self-contamination while donning/doffing PPE17,21,22
and the effectiveness of hospital cleaning procedures.23–25
The aim of this prospective cohort study was to assess ARO
transmission and cross contamination patterns in real-world
hospital settings using 2 surrogate markers (FP and MS2 bacterio-
phage) and selective bacterial cultures.
Methods
This study was conducted in a general medicine ward, a medical
intensive care unit (ICU), and an emergency department (ED)
at a 1,260-bed tertiary-care academic hospital in St Louis, Missouri.
Patients aged ≥18 years hospitalized between September 16, 2015,
and February 9, 2016, as well as HCP caring for the enrolled
patients were eligible for inclusion. The study protocol was reviewed
and approved by the Washington University Human Research
Protection Office. Written informed consent was obtained from
all patients or a legally authorized representative. Participating
HCP provided verbal consent prior to study participation.
Patient enrollment
Two patients on contact precautions for vancomycin-resistant
Enterococcus (VRE) or methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) were enrolled for each patient not on contact precautions.
At enrollment, each patient’s room was scanned for fluorescence
using an ultraviolet (UV) light. If fluorescence was detected, the
area was wiped clean before surrogate marker application. For
patients on contact precautions, flocked swab collection kits
(ESwab, Copan Diagnostics, Murietta, CA) were used to collect
swabs from each of the surfaces targeted for surrogate marker
application and to collect nasal, axilla, inguinal, and stool or rectal
swabs from each patient. Baseline patient and environmental sam-
ples were determined using selective bacterial culture.
Surrogate marker application
In each patient room, 4 high-touch surfaces were selected for
surrogate marker application: the front of the patient’s gown,
the top of each bed rail, and the bedside table or computer mouse.
Fluorescent powder (0.02 g, Glo Germ, Moab, UT) was applied to
each surface using a brush applicator. MS2 bacteriophage (1:10
dilution of commercially available stock solution in viral transport
medium, 1.0 × 108 PFU/mL per site,17 ZeptoMetrix, Buffalo, NY)
was applied using an atomizer (Teleflex, Morrisville, NC).
HCP enrollment and observations
Following surrogate marker application, trained study coordinators
observed each patient room for 2–4 hours from the hallway. During
this period, HCP hand hygiene (HH) compliance at room entry and
exit, defined as the use of alcohol hand rub or soap and water, were
recorded, and the first 3 surfaces that eachHCP touched after exiting
the room were flagged for later assessment. Also, 3–4 HCP who
entered the room during the observation period were recruited for
study participation.
Sample collection
After the first visit to a patient’s room, participating HCP had their
hands, face and hair, and clothing scanned with a UV light to iden-
tify areas of fluorescence. For patients on contact precautions, UV
scanning was performed after the HCP had removed PPE. HCP
were assessed only once, even if they visited the room multiple
times. At the end of the observation period, the patient’s room,
the first 3 surfaces that each participating HCP had touched after
exiting the room, and 4 additional locations on the study ward (ie,
medication cabinet, door handles, nurse’s station, and elevator but-
tons) were scanned for fluorescence.
Areas that fluoresced were photographed and trained study
coordinators collected surface samples using a viral transport
collection kit (Quidel, San Diego, CA). Additional samples were
collected from the 4 locations on the study ward and from each
participating HCP hands and gloves, face (ie, periorbital, nasal,
and oral areas), and sleeve and wrist. These samples were tested
for the presence of MS2.
If the patient was on contact precautions, flocked swab collec-
tion kits were used to collect additional samples from each area
where fluorescence was observed and from the 4 selected locations
on the study ward. One pooled sample was also collected from the
face, hands, and wrists of each participating HCP. These swabs
were submitted for selective bacterial culture.
After sample collection, the surfaces where the surrogate mark-
ers had been applied and any areas where fluorescence was
observed were wiped clean to prevent further transmission of
FP andMS2. Each patient roomwas used only once to furthermin-
imize the possibility of residual marker from a previous patient.
Bacterial culture
Swabs collected to identify MS2 contamination had RNA extracted
from the transport medium using the QIAamp viral RNAMini Kit
(Qiagen, Germantown, MD). Real-time reverse transcriptase pol-
ymerase chain reaction (PCR) was used to detect MS2 bacterio-
phage using the Cepheid Smart Cycler (Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA).
Swabs associated with patients on contact precautions were cul-
tured for VRE, MRSA, and methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus
aureus (MSSA). Swabs were plated to CHROMID VRE chromo-
genic medium (bioMérieux, Marcy-l’Étiole, France) to select for
VRE; on Spectra MRSA chromogenic agar (Remel, Lenexa,
KS) to select for MRSA; and on 5% sheep’s blood agar (Hardy
Diagnostics, Santa Maria, CA) to recover MSSA. All swabs were
also inoculated to 6.5% NaCl broth (Hardy Diagnostics) as an
enrichment method to recover VRE, MRSA, and MSSA if these
did not grow on the primary plated media. When growth was
observed, 4 colonies of each type of organism were subcultured
and identified using matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization
time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) using
VITEK MS.26–28 After bacterial identification was confirmed, phe-
notypic antimicrobial susceptibly testing and repetitive sequence-
based PCR (repPCR) were performed. Staphylococcal cassette
chromosomemec (SCCmec) typing was performed on all S. aureus
isolates.29,30
Statistical analysis
Patterns in the location and type of surrogate marker detections
were evaluated qualitatively. Odds ratios with 95% confidence
intervals and the χ2 or Fisher exact test were used to characterize
associations between predictor and outcome variables. Predictor
540 Jennie H. Kwon et al
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 04 Sep 2020 at 18:33:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
variables included patient contact isolation status and type of HCP.
Outcome variables included FP, MS2, and VRE, MRSA, or MSSA
detections in patient rooms, on HCP, and/or on surfaces touched
by HCP. The use of HH by HCP at room entry and exit were
assessed as both predictor and outcome variables. Two measures
of HCP HH compliance were examined: (1) HH at the first room
visit by participating HCP and (2) HH over all room visits by all
HCP. The first measure was used to determine the association
between HH and surrogate marker detections, and the second
provided a more complete picture of HH practices overall. All
analyses were performed using SPSS version 24.0 software (IBM,
Armonk, NY).
Results
In total, 25 patients were enrolled: 10 in the medicine ward, 10 in
the ICU, and 5 in the ED. Among them, 17 patients (68%) were on
contact precautions for VRE (n= 12), MRSA (n= 4), or VRE and
MRSA (n= 1). In addition, 77 HCP participated in the study: half
(n= 40, 52%) were nurses (n= 35), nurse practitioners (n= 3), or
student nurses (n= 2). Other participating HCP included physi-
cians (n= 16, 21%), patient care technicians (n= 9, 12%), respira-
tory therapists (n= 4, 5%), radiology technicians (n= 2, 3%),
dieticians (n= 2, 3%), 1 pharmacist (1%), a pharmacy student,
an infection preventionist, and a unit secretary.
Fluorescent powder detections
In 20 patient rooms (80%), fluorescence was detected on at least
1 site outside the areas where FP had been applied, most commonly
on the computer keyboard (n= 15), the counter (n= 7), or the
door handle (n= 5). In 3 cases, fluorescence was also detected
in the study ward, at the nurses’ station (n= 2) or on the medica-
tion cabinet (n= 1). Moreover, fluorescence was detected on 26
HCP (34%): on their body, hands, or clothing (n= 23) and/or
on a surface they touched after exiting the patient’s room (n= 10).
Examples of FP detections are shown in Figure 1.
The HCP caring for patients on contact precautions had signifi-
cantly fewer FP detections, on themselves and/or on the surfaces
they touched, than HCP caring for patients not on precautions
(19% vs 70%; P< .001) (Table 1). We found no significant differ-
ence in the rates of FP detection among different types of HCP
(Table 2).
MS2 detections
MS2 was detected in 9 patient rooms (36%), most commonly on
the computer (n= 4) and, outside 1 room, on amedication cabinet.
Moreover, 15 HCP (19%) hadMS2 detections, either on their body
or clothing (n= 10) and/or on surfaces touched after exiting a
patient room (n= 6), most commonly the door handle (n= 3).
Also, 1 HCP had MS2 identified on 2 sites on the body or clothing,
and 1 HCP had MS2 identified on 2 touched surfaces.
In general, MS2 was recovered less frequently on HCP and/or
surfaces touched by HCP caring for patients on contact precau-
tions than onHCP caring for patients not on precautions, but these
differences did not reach statistical significance (Table 1). MS2 was
more often detected on physicians than on nurses (40% vs 27%;
P= .02) (Table 2).
Bacterial culture results
Of the patients on contact precautions, 12 (71%) had baseline
swabs positive for the ARO for which the patient was placed on
contact precautions. Also, 2 patients, 1 on precautions for MRSA
and 1 for VRE, had swabs positive for both MRSA and VRE. One
patient on precautions for VRE had baseline swabs positive
for MSSA.
Moreover, 7 patients on contact precautions (41%) had 1 or
more room surfaces with a positive baseline bacterial culture
(Table 3). For 6 patients, the organism identified was the organism
that triggered contact precautions; 2 patients had surfaces that
were also positive for MSSA. The remaining patient, who was
on precautions for VRE but had a baseline swab positive for
MSSA, had baseline room surface swabs that were also positive
for MSSA.
Among the swabs collected from surfaces where fluorescence
was observed, only 2 had a positive bacterial culture (Table 3).
Fig. 1. Examples of fluorescent powder (FP)
detections observed in this study.
Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology 541
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 04 Sep 2020 at 18:33:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
One sample, from the foot of a bed, was positive for VRE. The
other, from an elevator button, was positive for MSSA. Both were
associated with the same patient, who had a baseline swab positive
for VRE.
Of the 54 HCP who cared for a patient on contact precautions,
8 (15%) had a positive pooled swab, all of which were positive for
MSSA (Table 3). These HCP had cared for 4 different patients,
none of whom had a baseline swab positive for MSSA, but one
of whom had a baseline room surface positive for MSSA.
Only 2 HCP (4%) who cared for a patient on contact precau-
tions had a touched surface with a positive bacterial culture
(Table 3). The first, a blood glucose monitor, was positive for
VRE, although the HCP was positive for MSSA, and MRSA was
identified in the patient’s room. The second, a door handle,
was positive for MSSA and was touched by an HCP who was
also positive for MSSA, although VRE was identified in the
patient’s room.
Among samples that were positive for VRE, 6 strain types were
identified by repPCR. The most common, type C, was associated
with 8 patients, 3 of whom were also positive for type B. Among
these, 2 patients had VRE type C identified in both patient and
room-surface samples. Another patient had multiple VRE types
(A, D, E, F) identified in patient and room-surface samples.
Among samples that were positive for S. aureus, 9 strain types
were identified by repPCR (3 among MRSA samples and 8 among
MSSA samples); 4 strain types were identified by SCCmec typing.
Also, 4 of the 5 patients who were positive for MRSA and 2 of the 3
patients with room surfaces positive for MRSA had the same strain
typing (repPCR B, SCCmec IV). Among 8 HCP who were positive
for MSSA, 7 had the same SCCmec type (III). Of these samples, 3
were repPCR type F; the others had diverse repPCR typing.
HCP hand hygiene observations
Both measures of HCP HH compliance yielded similar estimates.
HH compliance was lower at room entry than at room exit. Only
18% of HCP performed HH at room entry (14 of 77 first visits by
participating HCP and 54 of 298 total HCP visits), and 52% per-
formed HH at room exit (40 of 77 first visits and 54 of 290 total
visits).
The HCP HH compliance at room entry did not differ by
patient isolation status (Table 4). However, compliance at room
exit was better among the HCP caring for patients on contact pre-
cautions than among HCP caring for patients not on precautions:
61% versus 30% first room visits (P= .02) and 58% versus 37%
all room visits (P< .01). We observed no differences in HH
Table 1. Fluorescent Powder and MS2 Detections on Participating Healthcare Personnel (HCP) and Surfaces Touched by Participating HCP After
Exiting the Patient’s Room, by Patient Isolation Status
Type of Detection
All HCP (N= 77),
No. (%)
HCP Caring for Patient
on Contact Precautions
(N= 54), No. (%)
HCP Caring for Patient
Not on Precautions
(N= 23), No. (%) OR (95% CI) P Valuea
Fluorescent powderb 26 (34) 10 (19) 16 (70) 0.10 (0.03–0.31) <.001
HCPc 23 (30) 9 (17) 14 (61) 0.13 (0.04–0.39) <.001
Touched surfaced 10 (13) 3 (6) 7 (30) 0.13 (0.03–0.58) .006
MS2e 15 (19) 8 (15) 7 (30) 0.40 (0.12–1.27) .13
HCPc 10 (13) 4 (7) 6 (26) 0.23 (0.06–0.90) .06
Touched surfaced 6 (8) 4 (7) 2 (9) 0.84 (0.14–4.94) 1.00
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; PCR, polymerase chain reaction.
aFisher’s exact test was used for comparisons due to small cell sizes.
bDefined as the visualization of fluorescence when the HCP or surface was scanned with a handheld UV light.
cIncludes HCP hands, sleeves/wrist, gloves, face, and clothing.
dEnvironmental surfaces touched by HCP after leaving the patient room.
eDefined as the detection of MS2 on a swab collected from the HCP or surface via real-time reverse-transcriptase PCR.
Table 2. Fluorescent Powder and MS2 Detections on Participating Healthcare Personnel (HCP) and/or Surfaces Touched by HCP Type
Type of Detection
Surrogate Marker
Detected, No. (%)
Surrogate Marker
Not Detected, No. (%) OR (95% CI) P Value
Fluorescent powder N= 26 N= 51
Nurse (n= 40)a 13 (50) 26 (51) Reference
Physician (n= 16) 3 (12) 13 (26) 0.48 (0.12–1.98) .31
Other (n= 21)b 10 (39) 12 (24) 1.89 (0.64–5.57) .25
MS2 N= 15 N= 62
Nurse (n= 40)a 4 (27) 35 (57) Reference
Physician (n= 16) 6 (40) 10 (16) 5.40 (1.27–22.93) .02
Other (n= 21)b 5 (33) 17 (27) 2.57 (0.67–11.88) .16
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
aIncludes nurse practitioners and student nurses.
bIncludes patient care technicians, respiratory therapists, radiology techs, dieticians, pharmacist, pharmacy student, infection prevention technician, and unit secretary.
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compliance at first room visit for nurses versus physicians or other
HCP (Table 5). However, when considering all room visits, nurses
were more likely than other nonphysician HCP to perform HH at
room entry (25% vs 8%; P< .01) and were more likely than physi-
cians to perform HH at room exit (59% vs 43%; P= .03).
The association between HCP HH and surrogate marker detec-
tions is shown in Table 6. Although few associations were observed
between either HHmeasure and surrogate marker detections, HCP
who performed HH immediately after the first room exit and
before being swabbed were less likely than HCP who did not per-
form HH at room exit to have fluorescence detected (20% vs
49%; P= .008).
Discussion
In this study, the transfer of both FP and MS2 were observed both
inside and outside patient rooms, on participating HCP, and on
surfaces touched by HCP after exiting patient rooms. Transfer
of FP occurred more frequently than the transfer of MS2, and pos-
itive bacterial cultures were even less frequent.
Although few studies have utilized both FP and MS2 as surro-
gate markers, some have also reported higher rates of FP compared
to MS2 detections.17,31 Others have reported similar detection
rates19,32 or more frequent MS2 detections.21 This lack of agree-
ment may indicate that neither marker performs significantly
Table 3. Microbiologic Culture Results for the Patients on Contact Precautions and the Healthcare Personnel (HCP) Who Cared for These
Patients
Samples All Positive VRE MRSA MSSAa
Samples from patients (n= 17)
Baseline patient swabsb 13c 9 d 5e 1f
Baseline room surface swabs 7 g 3 h 3i 3j
Surface swabs from areas where fluorescence was observed inside patient rooms 1 1 k 0 0
Surface swabs from areas where fluorescence was observed outside patient rooms 1 0 0 1 l
Samples from HCP (n= 54)
Pooled swab from face, hands, and wrist 8 0 0 8m
Swabs collected from surfaces touched by participating HCP after leaving patient rooms 2 1 n 0 1o
Note. VRE, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; MSSA, methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus; NA, not
applicable.
aMSSA is not an indication for contact precautions.
bIncluded nasal, axilla, inguinal skin, and stool or rectal swabs.
cFor 12 patients, the identified organismmatched the reason for contact precautions; 2 patients had swabs thatwere positive for both VRE andMRSA; 1 patient had
swabs that were positive for only MSSA.
dRepetitive sequence-based PCR (repPCR) results were variable: samples from 1 patient were type B; samples from 4 patients were type C; samples from 2 patients
were types B and C; samples from 1 patient were types A, B, and C; and samples from 1 patient were types A, D, E, and F.
eSamples from 4 patients were repetitive sequence-based PCR (repPCR) type B and staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec (SCCmec) type IV. Samples from
1 patient were repPCR types E and G, SCCmec type III.
fSamples were repPCR types C and B, SCCmec type III.
gFor 6 patients, the identified organismmatched the reason for contact precautions; 1 patient had baseline room surface swabs that were positive for both MRSA
and MSSA; and 1 patient had swabs that were positive for both VRE and MSSA. One patient had baseline room-surface swabs that were positive for only MSSA.
hBaseline room-surface samples from 2 patient rooms were all repPCR type C; samples from the third room were repPCR types D and F.
iSamples from 2 rooms were repPCR type B, SCCmec type IV. Samples from one room were repPCR types E and G, SCCmec type III.
jSamples from the first roomwere repPCR type B, SCCmec type III. Samples from the second roomwere repPCR type E, SCCmec type I. Samples from the third room
were repPCR types B and D, SCCmec type III.
kSamples were repPCR types D and E.
lThese samples were repPCR type A, SCCmec type I.
mOne HCP had samples that were repPCR type A, SCCmec type III; 1 HCP had samples that were repPCR type B, SCCmec type III; 1 HCP had samples that were
repPCR type E, SCCmec type I; 3 HCP had samples that were repPCR type F, SCCmec type III; 1 HCP had samples that were repPCR types A, C, and D, SCCmec type III;
and 1 HCP had samples that were repPCR types E and D, SCCmec type III.
nSamples were repPCR type C.
oTwo surfaces touched by the same HCP had samples that were positive for MSSA types H and A, SCCmec type III.
Table 4. Healthcare Personnel (HCP) Observations Where Hand Hygiene Was Performed, at First Room Entry/Exit and All Room Entries/Exits, by
Patient Isolation Status
Observation
Patients on Contact
Precautions, No. (%)
Patients Not on Contact
Precautions, No. (%) OR (95% CI) P Valuea
First room visit by participating HCP N= 54 N= 23
Room entry 8 (15) 6 (26) 2.03 (0.61–6.71) .33
Room exit 33 (61) 7 (30) 0.28 (0.10–0.79) .02
All HCP room visits N= 221 N= 77
Room entry 38 (17) 16 (21) 1.26 (0.66–2.43) .50
Room exitb 124 (58) 28 (37) 0.44 (0.26–0.75) .003
Note. OR, odds ratio; CU, confidence interval.
aThe Fisher exact test was used for comparisons due to small cell sizes.
b8 room-exit observations were missing because room exit could not be observed.
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better than the other, or it may be related to differences in the
means of detection (visual versus swabs). However, the 2 markers
are thought to model different types of contamination: FP may
model gross bacterial contamination and MS2 may simulate viral
contamination events.21 Therefore, different detection ratesmay be
reasonable. More data are needed to determine which surrogate
markers are better models for the study of ARO transmission.
In contrast to surrogate markers, bacterial culture may identify
actual ARO transmission events. This study focused on 2 AROs
that routinely trigger contact precautions, MRSA and VRE, as well
as MSSA. Although MSSA does not routinely trigger contact pre-
cautions, it is a clinically relevant pathogen that causes significant
morbidity in hospitalized patients.33,34 The greater frequency of
surrogate marker detections as compared to ARO detections
may suggest that FP and MS2 overrepresent the likelihood of
ARO transmission. Previous studies using MS2 to model the
spread of Clostridioides difficile spores have also reported more fre-
quent MS2 detections versus bacterial detections on HCP skin and
clothing.19,35 However, in our study, both surrogate markers were
present in all of the patient rooms, and only 7 rooms had surfaces
positive for VRE,MRSA, orMSSA at baseline. Therefore, the lower
rate of positive bacterial cultures was not unexpected.
In this study, both surrogate markers were identified less fre-
quently among HCP caring for patients on contact precautions
versus HCP caring for patients not on contact precautions,
although the difference only reached significance for FP. We also
observed that HCP caring for patients on contact precautionsmore
frequently performed HH at room exit and that HCP who per-
formed HH had fewer FP detections. Previous studies have also
reported an association between contact precautions and HH
Table 5. Healthcare Personnel (HCP) Hand Hygiene Observations, at First Room Entry/Exit and All Room Entries/Exits, by HCP Type
Observation Hand Hygiene Performed, No (%) OR (95% CI) P Value
First room visit by participating HCP
Room entry (n= 77)
Nurse (n= 40)a 7 (18) Reference
Physician (n= 16) 5 (31) 0.47 (0.12–1.77) .26
Other (n= 21)b 2 (10) 2.02 (0.38–10.70) .41
Room exit (n= 77)
Nurse (n= 40)a 19 (48) Reference
Physician (n= 16) 9 (56) 0.70 (0.22–2.26) .56
Other (n= 21)b 12 (57) 0.68 (0.23–1.97) .48
All HCP room visits
Room entry (n= 298)
Nurse (n= 150)a 38 (25) Reference
Physician (n= 71) 10 (14) 2.07 (0.97–4.44) .06
Other (n= 77)b 6 (8) 4.02 (1.62–9.98) .003
Room exitc (n= 290)
Nurse (n= 147)a 87 (59) Reference
Physician (n= 68) 29 (43) 1.95 (1.09–3.49) .03
Other (n= 75)b 36 (48) 1.57 (0.90–2.75) .11
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
aIncludes student nurses and nurse practitioners.
bIncludes patient care technicians, respiratory therapists, radiology techs, dieticians, pharmacist, pharmacy student, infection prevention technician, and
unit secretary.
c8 room-exit observations were missing because room exit could not be observed.
Table 6. Association Between Hand Hygiene Performance at Room Exit and Detection of Fluorescence and MS2 on Healthcare Personnel (HCP)
and on Environmental Surfaces Touched by HCP
Observation
Hand Hygiene Performed,
No. (%)
Hand Hygiene Not Performed,
No. (%) OR (95% CI) P Value
First room exit by participating HCP N= 41 N= 36
Fluorescent powder detected 8 (20) 18 (49) 3.79 (1.38–10.38) .008
MS2 detected 8 (20) 7 (19) 0.93 (0.30–2.89) .91
All HCP room exits N= 29 N= 48
Fluorescent powder detected 7 (24) 19 (40) 2.06 (0.74–5.76) .17
MS2 detected 7 (24) 8 (17) 0.63 (0.20–1.97) .42
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
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compliance36,37 and between HH and fewer MS2 detections on the
hands of HCP.38,39 These findings suggest that both contact pre-
cautions and HH play an important role in preventing the spread
of AROs, and they provide additional data to support the role of
contact precautions in preventing ARO transmission.
Although we found no significant differences in the rate of FP
detections among different types of HCP, MS2 was more fre-
quently detected among physicians than among nurses. This
observation may also be related to HH because nurses were more
likely than physicians to perform HH at room exit. As in prior
studies,40 observed HCP HH compliance was low. However,
differences in HH compliance by HCP job category suggest that
a role exists for interventions promoting HH among all HCP.
A key strength of this study is the use of multiple surrogate
markers and bacterial cultures, which helps to generate a more
complete model of pathogen transmission. Other strengths include
the real-world hospital setting and detailedHCP observations. This
study also had several limitations. The small sample size may have
limited the statistical power to detect differences in surrogate
marker detections. This study also only included patients on con-
tact precautions for VRE and MRSA, and we only tested for VRE,
MRSA, andMSSA. Therefore, it is unclear how our findings would
translate to other AROs, such asC. difficile andmultidrug-resistant
gram-negative bacteria. Finally, despite detailedHCP observations,
it was not always possible to observe HH that occurred inside
patient rooms when the door was closed. Therefore, we may have
underestimated HCP HH compliance; however, our internal, rou-
tineHHobservations indicate that HH compliance among hospital
staff is less than ideal overall.
Despite these limitations, this study demonstrated transfer of
both FP and MS2 beyond the initial areas of contamination inside
patient rooms. Our findings suggest that both surrogate markers
may be useful tools for studying ARO transmission. Larger studies
using surrogate markers to assess ARO transmission and HCP
cross-contamination are warranted, especially those focusing on
the impact of contact precautions on ARO transmission.
Acknowledgments. The study team acknowledges the assistance and support
of the nursing and staff members at Barnes-Jewish Hospital in this project.
Financial support. This study was funded by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (grant no. 3U54CK000162-05S1). The fluorescent powder used
in this study was donated by the Glo Germ Company (Moab, UT). Glo Germ
did not play a role in the development of the study design or result interpreta-
tion. Dr Kwon is also supported by the Washington University Institute of
Clinical and Translational Sciences and the National Center for Advancing
Translational Sciences (NCATS) of theNational Institutes of Health (NIH grant
no. UL1TR000448, subaward KL2TR000450) and the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (grant no. 1K23AI137321-01A1).
Conflicts of interest. All authors report no potential conflicts of interest
relevant to this article.
References
1. Boyce JM. Environmental contamination makes an important contribution
to hospital infection. J Hosp Infect 2007;65 suppl 2:50–54.
2. Otter JA, Yezli S, Salkeld JA, French GL. Evidence that contaminated sur-
faces contribute to the transmission of hospital pathogens and an overview
of strategies to address contaminated surfaces in hospital settings. Am J
Infect Control 2013;41:S6–S11.
3. Suleyman G, Alangaden G, Bardossy AC. The role of environmental con-
tamination in the transmission of nosocomial pathogens and healthcare-
associated infections. Curr Infect Dis Rep 2018;20:12.
4. Weber DJ, Anderson D, Rutala WA. The role of the surface environment in
healthcare-associated infections. Curr Opin Infect Dis 2013;26:338–344.
5. Mitchell A, Spencer M, Edmiston C Jr. Role of healthcare apparel and other
healthcare textiles in the transmission of pathogens: a review of the litera-
ture. J Hosp Infect 2015;90:285–292.
6. Muto CA, Jernigan JA, Ostrowsky BE, et al. SHEA guideline for preventing
nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of Staphylococcus
aureus and Enterococcus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:362–386.
7. Morgan DJ, Murthy R, Munoz-Price LS, et al. Reconsidering contact precau-
tions for endemicmethicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2015;36:1163–1172.
8. Morgan DJ, Wenzel RP, Bearman G. Contact precautions for endemic
MRSA and VRE: time to retire legal mandates. JAMA 2017;318:329–330.
9. RubinMA, SamoreMH, Harris AD. The importance of contact precautions
for endemic methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and vancomycin-
resistant enterococci. JAMA 2018;319:863–864.
10. Chen LF, Knelson LP, GergenMF, et al.A prospective study of transmission
of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) between environmental sites
and hospitalized patients—the TransFER study. Infect Control Hosp
Epidemiol 2019;40:47–52.
11. Drees M, Snydman DR, Schmid CH, et al. Prior environmental contamina-
tion increases the risk of acquisition of vancomycin-resistant enterococci.
Clin Infect Dis 2008;46:678–685.
12. Huang SS, Datta R, Platt R. Risk of acquiring antibiotic-resistant bacteria
from prior room occupants. Arch Intern Med 2006;166:1945–1951.
13. HaydenMK, BlomDW, Lyle EA,Moore CG,Weinstein RA. Risk of hand or
glove contamination after contact with patients colonized with vancomy-
cin-resistant enterococcus or the colonized patients’ environment. Infect
Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008;29:149–154.
14. Morgan DJ, Rogawski E, Thom KA, et al. Transfer of multidrug-resistant
bacteria to healthcare workers’ gloves and gowns after patient contact increases
with environmental contamination. Crit Care Med 2012;40:1045–1051.
15. Snyder GM, Thom KA, Furuno JP, et al. Detection of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus and vancomycin-resistant enterococci on the gowns
and gloves of healthcare workers. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008;29:
583–589.
16. Tenorio AR, Badri SM, Sahgal NB, et al. Effectiveness of gloves in the pre-
vention of hand carriage of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus species by
healthcare workers after patient care. Clin Infect Dis 2001;32:826–829.
17. Kwon JH, Burnham CD, Reske KA, et al. Assessment of healthcare worker
protocol deviations and self-contamination during personal protective equip-
ment donning and doffing. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2017;38:1077–1083.
18. Duckro AN, Blom DW, Lyle EA, Weinstein RA, Hayden MK. Transfer of
vancomycin-resistant enterococci via healthcare-worker hands.Arch Intern
Med 2005;165:302–307.
19. Alhmidi H, Koganti S, Tomas ME, Cadnum JL, Jencson A, Donskey CJ. A
pilot study to assess use of fluorescent lotion in patient care simulations to
illustrate pathogen dissemination and train personnel in correct use of per-
sonal protective equipment. Antimicrob Resist Infect Control 2016;5:40.
20. Koganti S, Alhmidi H, Tomas ME, Cadnum JL, Jencson A, Donskey CJ.
Evaluation of hospital floors as a potential source of pathogen dissemination
using a nonpathogenic virus as a surrogate marker. Infect Control Hosp
Epidemiol 2016;37:1374–1377.
21. Casanova L, Alfano-Sobsey E, Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Sobsey M. Virus
transfer from personal protective equipment to healthcare employees’ skin
and clothing. Emerg Infect Dis 2008;14:1291–1293.
22. Bell T, Smoot J, Patterson J, Smalligan R, Jordan R. Ebola virus disease: the
use of fluorescents as markers of contamination for personal protective
equipment. IDCases 2015;2:27–30.
23. Fattorini M, Ceriale E, Nante N, et al.Use of a fluorescent marker for assess-
ing hospital bathroom cleanliness. Am J Infect Control 2016;44:1066–1068.
24. Boyce JM, Havill NL, Havill HL, Mangione E, Dumigan DG, Moore BA.
Comparison of fluorescent marker systems with 2 quantitative methods
of assessing terminal cleaning practices. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011;
32:1187–1193.
25. Hung IC, Chang HY, Cheng A, et al. Application of a fluorescent marker
with quantitative bioburden methods to assess cleanliness. Infect Control
Hosp Epidemiol 2018;39:1296–1300.
Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology 545
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 04 Sep 2020 at 18:33:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
26. Manji R, Bythrow M, Branda JA, et al. Multi-center evaluation of the
VITEK(R) MS system for mass spectrometric identification of non-
Enterobacteriaceae gram-negative bacilli. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect
Dis 2014;33:337–346.
27. Richter SS, Sercia L, Branda JA, et al. Identification of Enterobacteriaceae
by matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spec-
trometry using the VITEKMS system. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis 2013;
32:1571–1578.
28. McElvania TeKippe E, BurnhamCA. Evaluation of the Bruker Biotyper and
VITEKMSMALDI-TOFMS systems for the identification of unusual and/
or difficult-to-identify microorganisms isolated from clinical specimens.
Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis 2014;33:2163–2171.
29. El Feghaly RE, Stamm JE, Fritz SA, Burnham CA. Presence of the bla(Z)
beta-lactamase gene in isolates of Staphylococcus aureus that appear peni-
cillin susceptible by conventional phenotypic methods. Diagn Microbiol
Infect Dis 2012;74:388–393.
30. Fritz SA, Hogan PG, Singh LN, et al. Contamination of environmental sur-
faces with Staphylococcus aureus in households with children infected with
methicillin-resistant S aureus. JAMA Pediatr 2014;168:1030–1038.
31. Casanova LM, Erukunuakpor K, Kraft CS, et al.Assessing viral transfer dur-
ing doffing of Ebola-level personal protective equipment in a biocontain-
ment unit. Clin Infect Dis 2018;66:945–949.
32. Tomas ME, Kundrapu S, Thota P, et al. Contamination of healthcare per-
sonnel during removal of personal protective equipment. JAMA InternMed
2015;175:1904–1910.
33. Thomsen IP, Kadari P, Soper NR, et al.Molecular epidemiology of invasive
Staphylococcus aureus infections and concordance with colonization iso-
lates. J Pediatr 2019;210:173–177.
34. Hassoun A, Linden PK, Friedman B. Incidence, prevalence, and manage-
ment of MRSA bacteremia across patient populations—a review of
recent developments in MRSA management and treatment. Crit Care
2017;21:211.
35. Alhmidi H, John A, Mana TC, et al. Evaluation of viral surrogate markers
for study of pathogen dissemination during simulations of patient care.
Open Forum Infect Dis 2017;4:ofx128.
36. Bearman GM, Marra AR, Sessler CN, et al. A controlled trial of universal
gloving versus contact precautions for preventing the transmission ofmulti-
drug-resistant organisms. Am J Infect Control 2007;35:650–655.
37. Harris AD, Pineles L, Belton B, et al. Universal glove and gown use and
acquisition of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in the ICU: a randomized trial.
JAMA 2013;310:1571–1580.
38. Sassi HP, Sifuentes LY, Koenig DW, et al. Control of the spread of viruses in
a long-term care facility using hygiene protocols. Am J Infect Control
2015;43:702–706.
39. Julian TR, Leckie JO, Boehm AB. Virus transfer between fingerpads and
fomites. J Appl Microbiol 2010;109:1868–1874.
40. Mastrandrea R, Soto-Aladro A, Brouqui P, Barrat A. Enhancing the evalu-
ation of pathogen transmission risk in a hospital by merging hand-hygiene
compliance and contact data: a proof-of-concept study. BMC Res Notes
2015;8:426.
546 Jennie H. Kwon et al
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 04 Sep 2020 at 18:33:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
